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Financial Conflicts of Interest in Science 
Joanna K. Sax, J.D., Ph.D* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent legal scholarship and medical literature pays great attention to fi-
nancial conflicts of interest that arise in biomedical research.  In brief, the 
source of funding for experiments or clinical trials may influence or appear 
to influence the direction and publication of such research.  This influence 
may have detrimental impacts on scientific integrity and patient care.1  The 
current policies that address the undue influence of financial conflicts of in-
terest tend to focus on disclosure of funding from the private sector, which 
means that the conflict of interest may already exist.  The current guidelines 
and regulations that govern conflicts of interest are inadequate because they 
do not fully address the harms caused by financial conflicts of interest.  
This article proposes a novel approach to implementing effective conflict of 
interest policies by analyzing the underlying behavior leading to conflicts of 
interest and proposing policy solutions that regulate behavior prior to the 
creation of an actual conflict of interest.  In this way, the policy proposals 
attempt to incentivize behavior(s) that will not be unduly influenced by the 
funding source. 
An overview of the financial landscape of biomedical research is critical 
to understanding the problems associated with financial conflicts of interest.  
The majority of basic biomedical research occurs in laboratories at universi-
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Biology, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., University of Pennsylvania. 
The author thanks Ed Dauer for helpful comments that improved this paper.  This article, or 
portions thereof, was presented at the 2011 Southwest Junior Faculty Conference at Arizona 
State University O’Connor College of Law, 2011 Southern California Junior Faculty Work-
shop, 2011 Law & Society Annual Meeting, and the California Western School of Law Fa-
culty Workshop.  The author wishes to thank the participants at these presentations and/or 
conferences for helpful input. 
1. See Shira Lipton et al., Conflicts of Interest in Academic Research: Policies, 
Processes, and Attitudes, 11 ACCOUNTABILITY IN RES. 83, 94 (2004) (“[W]hen asked about 
the specific risks associated with financial ties between academe and industry, approximately 
three fourths of the respondents believed that there is an increased risk for bias in research 
design, analyses, and presentation of research results, and a heightened possibility of publi-
cation delay or suppression of results.”). 
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ties.2  Faculty, known as Principal Investigators (“PIs”), establish their own 
laboratories that may consist of personnel including post-doctoral research-
ers, graduate students working towards their PhDs, and laboratory research 
assistants.  In general, PIs apply for grants from the government, and most 
often the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”), to fund the laboratory re-
search.3  In addition, PIs may apply to other federal agencies or state agen-
cies for funding.  PIs may also acquire funding from non-profit organiza-
tions such as the Howard Hughes Medical Institute.  Finally, PIs may also 
be funded by the for-profit private sector.  In general, however, reputational 
and financial considerations lead most PIs to apply for RO1 grants, which 
are funded through the NIH grant process.4 
One of the reasons that public money is used to fund basic science is be-
cause a private market does not exist for such early stages of research where 
most experiments fail.5  Despite the slow progress in science, scientists may 
learn from failed experiments, and of course, some experiments provide 
fruitful information.  If a new pathway for cancer is discovered, or a new 
gene mutation is uncovered, these types of discoveries may become targets 
for drug discovery and treatment of disease.  Once this occurs, a market for 
the private sector emerges and the pharmaceutical industry may want to in-
vest in Research & Development (“R&D”).6  Despite the slow process of 
basic science, evidence suggests that there is a satisfactory rate of return to 
the economy from publicly funded research.7 
The private sector plays an important role in bringing drugs and devices 
to patients.  Private companies have two main goals: (1) the discovery, de-
velopment and production of new drugs and devices and (2) making a prof-
 
2. Biomedical research is the use of science to understand disease.  See Definition of 
Biomedical Research, THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/ 
biomedical+science (last visited June 29, 2011) (“the application of the principles of the nat-
ural sciences to medicine”). 
3. JOINT ECON. COMM., THE BENEFITS OF MEDICAL RESEARCH AND THE ROLE OF THE NIH 
(2000) available at http://www.faseb.org/portals/0/pdfs/opa/2008/nih_research_benefits.pdf. 
4. Types of Grant Programs, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, http://grants.nih.gov/grants/funding 
/funding_program.htm (last updated Sept. 29, 2011). 
5. See e.g., Ian Cockburn & Rebecca Henderson, Public-Private Interaction in Pharma-
ceutical Research, 93 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 12725, 12725 (1996); see also SEC’Y’S 
ADVISORY COMM. ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOC’Y, GENE PATENTS AND LICENSING 
PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON PATIENT ACCESS TO GENETIC TESTS, REPORT OF THE 
SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON GENETICS, HEALTH AND SOCIETY 2 (2010) [hereinaf-
ter GENE PATENTS], available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/sacghs/reports/SACGHSpatents__ 
report_2010.pdf. 
6. Jerome P. Kassirer, Financial Conflict of Interest: An Unresolved Ethical Frontier, 27 
AM. J. L. & MED. 149, 152 (2001) (“Proponents of strong academic-industry relations argue 
that when public support of research is not forthcoming, and when profits are achievable, 
private industry will do a better job in developing useful products than academia.”). 
7. JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 3, at 9. 
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it.8  The first goal directly benefits the public.  The second goal also benefits 
the public, but it carries a potential problem: a profit-seeking goal may do-
minate the scientific goal.9  This problem creates distrust, damaging influ-
ences, and frankly, can promote bad science.  High profile examples of this 
type of behavior include the reporting of only six months of data in a clini-
cal trial that is designed to contain twelve months of data, incomplete re-
porting of data, and concealing clinical data that demonstrates that a treat-
ment may be harmful.10  When faculty obtains private funding, a public-
private interaction may exist and PIs may have vested financial interest in 
the results of the research.  Put differently, through the relationship with a 
private company, PIs may also have economic motives that blanket their 
main goal of contributing to science in an effort to better understand diseas-
es. These issues exemplify the problems at the heart of a financial conflict 
of interest. 
The public-private interaction has increased over the past thirty years.  In 
1980, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act, which allowed a university and 
the inventor to patent the new technology stemming from a PI’s laborato-
ry.11  Prior to the Bayh-Dole Act, only the federal government could patent 
an invention developed through federally-funded research.12  After the 
Bayh-Dole Act, once the university obtained the patent for an invention, the 
university could now license the technology to the private sector.13  The Act 
significantly changed the relationship between the private and public sector, 
resulting in both positive and negative consequences.  The Bayh-Dole Act 
 
8. Catherine DeAngelis, The Influence of Money on Medical Science, 296 JAMA 996, 
996 (2006); see also, SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST 1, 181 (“Public-
interest science asks how knowledge can contribute to ameliorating social, technological, or 
environmental problems.  Private-interest science asks how knowledge can produce a profit-
able product or defend a corporate client, whether or not it has social benefits and whether or 
not the product is distributed fairly and equitably.”). 
9. DeAngelis, supra note 8, at 996. 
10. Id.; but see, Thomas P. Stossel, Has the Hunt for Conflicts of Interest Gone Too 
Far?, 336 BRIT. MED. J. 476, 476 (2008) (“All of these charges obscure the fact that only 
private companies bring new products to patients and that medical care has improved steadi-
ly and spectacularly because of them.  Fraud and pathological bias could never have con-
ferred these monumental achievements.”). 
11. Jesse A. Goldner, Dealing with Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: IRB 
Oversight as the Next Best Solution to the Abolitionist Approach, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
379, 385 (2000); GENE PATENTS, supra note 5, at 28. 
12. See generally, Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: 
Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 
1671-95 (1996) (describing the history of the government’s policies). 
13. Goldner, supra note 11, at 385; Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 1665, 1691 (“The agen-
cy response was to allow universities with approved technology transfer capabilities to retain 
title to patents and to grant exclusive licenses to industry under the terms of Institutional Pa-
tent Agreements (“IPAs”).”); see also Kassirer, supra note 6, at 150; 35 U.S.C. §§ 200, 202 
(2010). 
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permits universities to license patents directly to biotech companies.  These 
licenses have two main advantages: (1) revenue for the university and (2) 
increase in the development of discoveries in basic science into potential 
treatments for disease.14  Another advantage is that the PIs, who are proba-
bly most familiar with the patented discovery, are available for consultation 
by the licensee.15  Conversely, one negative consequence is the develop-
ment of changes in ethical norms in research.16 
Over the past thirty years, since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, the 
public-private interaction has dramatically increased, not only through li-
censing but also through other funding activities in the basic and clinical 
sciences.  The private sector may enter into agreements with universities in 
a number of ways.  The private sector may license specific discoveries, fund 
clinical trials, enter into exclusive licensing agreements with the institution, 
or fund the laboratories of PIs.17  Universities may even facilitate PIs to be 
founders of start-up companies.  The start-up companies are based on a 
product from the PI’s laboratory.18  The university stands to make money 
from the start-up through licensing agreements or the university, itself, may 
hold equity in the start-up company.19  Any of these types of agreements 
can create financial conflicts of interest if the research and academic inte-
grity of the PI or the institution is diminished due to any undue influence of 
a profit-seeking motive. 
The goal of any conflict of interest policy is to resolve or eliminate the 
profit-seeking goal from having an undue influence on the soundness of the 
science.  In this way, an effective policy promotes the public goals and the 
private goals and eliminates the issue of when the profit-seeking motive dis-
torts the science. 
To date, most policies governing financial conflicts of interest center on 
disclosure.  That is, PIs must disclose certain financial ties with the private 
sector to the university or the public funding source.  The policy of disclo-
sure, however, may be inadequate because the conflict may already exist.  
This article proposes a new approach to financial conflict of interest poli-
cies by altering the environment in which the agreements with the private 
 
14. Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 1698-99 (“Like the government, universities are not in a 
position to develop new discoveries into commercial products, but need to attract commer-
cial licensees to invest in further development.  University-owned patent rights would facili-
tate this process in part by providing a source of exclusive rights to assure private firms that 
successful products would be profitable.”). 
15. Id. at 1700. 
16. KRIMSKY, supra note 8, at 7. 
17. See, e.g., About CTT, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER ,http://www.ctt.upenn.edu/about.html (last visited July 1, 2011). 
18. See, e.g., Upstart, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA CENTER FOR TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER, http://www.ctt.upenn.edu/upstart.html (last visited July 1, 2011). 
19. See, e.g., id. 
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sector are made. 
Consider the following general scenario to understand the underlying be-
havior that may give rise to the susceptibility of influence from the private 
sector in the decision-making process.  Assume an individual is experienc-
ing work-related chronic stress and ask him to respond to a series of ques-
tions requiring him to make decisions.  The responses will be referred to as 
“Behavior 1.”  Now, assume that individual is in a situation devoid of stress 
and ask him to respond to a series of questions requiring him to make deci-
sions.  The responses will be referred to as “Behavior 2.”20  Recent scholar-
ship in behavioral ecology addresses the different behaviors that may result 
when an individual is placed in different environments. 
A policy may seek to regulate the person demonstrating Behavior 1 and 
not Behavior 2.  Or, the law may attempt to incentivize the person demon-
strating Behavior 1 to change their behavior to that of Behavior 2.  Howev-
er, policymakers need to understand why an individual might exhibit both 
Behavior 1 and Behavior 2 depending on the circumstances of his environ-
ment.  Under the above hypothetical, the environment, for example, expo-
sure to chronic stress versus no stress, leads to different behaviors. 
Behavioral ecology can be utilized and applied to identify and regulate 
financial conflicts of interest in academic settings.21  The recognized prob-
lem is that a financial incentive can have an undue influence over faculty as 
they conduct and report their research.  Without an understanding of why 
there is this problem of undue influence, it is difficult to craft an effective 
solution. 
This article proposes that an analysis of behavior may be utilized to 
create an effective policy addressing financial conflicts of interest.  Impor-
tantly, this article focuses on the academics that conduct basic science.  
Many of the issues faced by basic scientists are different than those faced 
by clinicians or institutions.22  Academics conducting basic science face dif-
ferent pressures than clinicians and institutions, therefore their interests 
should be addressed separately in order to best craft a policy that addresses 
their unique positions. 
To apply a behavioral approach to conflicts of interest, a comparison of 
academics in the behavioral ecology hypothetical described above can be 
 
20. Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. 
L. REV. 405, 501 (figure 3) (2005). 
21. See, e.g., Stephen G. Pauker & John B. Wong, How Should Physicians Think?, 304 
JAMA 1233, 1234 (2010) (“Tools and perspectives from other fields can add perspective 
and provide solutions in medicine.”). 
22. See, e.g. Michael M.E. Jones et al., Restoring Balance to Industry-Academia Rela-
tionships in an Era of Institutional Financial Conflicts of Interest, 289 JAMA 741, 741-746 
(2003) (addressing institutional financial conflicts of interest, but also lumping together dis-
cussion of conflict of interest policies for clinicians and researchers). 
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used.  See Figure 1.  PIs may exist in a state of chronic work-related stress.  
Academic scientists are under pressure to achieve results, support laborato-
ry personnel and meet other obligations.  This chronic stress may alter their 
decisions when faced with a situation that may pose a financial conflict of 
interest, such as ghostwriting an article, not reporting negative results, and 
spinning positive results.23  If, however, these academic scientists are re-
lieved, at least in part, from the chronic work-related stress, they may make 
different decisions.  By understanding environmental differences and the 
impact on decision-making, policies concerning conflicts of interest may be 
designed to address and regulate the environment that creates the conflict of 
interest situation; that is, address the chronic work-related stresses that lead 
to poor decision-making. 
 
Figure 1.24 
 
 
23. This article focuses on financial conflicts of interest.  Non-financial pressures exist 
as well; however, these are usually well managed by the scientific process and institutional 
policies.  See David Korn, Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research, 285 JAMA 2234, 
2234 (2000). 
24. See Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 405, 501 (figure 3) (2005). 
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An understanding of the background of the public-private interaction is 
critical to fully appreciate the rise of the financial conflicts of interest in 
biomedical science.  Part II of this Article describes the rise of financial 
conflicts of interest and the types of harms that can occur in the absence of 
effective policy to regulate financial conflicts of interest. 
Part III describes the current system addressing conflicts of interest, 
which relies mostly on disclosure.  The policy of disclosure is inadequate 
and this section analyzes the deficiencies in the present system. 
Part IV analyzes research in the social sciences and psychology and ap-
plies important developments in these areas to understand decisions that 
create financial conflicts of interest.  Importantly, this section describes that 
the stress experienced by PIs may contribute to inappropriate responses to 
situations that contain a conflict.  This part also includes a discussion of an 
empirical analysis of the results of a survey analyzing the responses of aca-
demic scientists to hypothetical situations in which a conflict of interest 
may arise.  The results of this study can be utilized to assist in addressing 
areas in which a financial conflict of interest policy might be most benefi-
cial. 
Part V proposes policy recommendations to regulate financial conflicts 
of interest.  The Article proposes a new approach that involves addressing 
issues in the environment in order to create an effective policy.  Within the 
university, policy proposals include implementation of education programs, 
use of system-wide default rules, and changes to academic requirements.  
The creation of novel approaches to policy can be incentivized through fed-
eral grants that reward institutions for implementing effective strategies.  
Outside the institution, changes to intellectual property law may functional-
ly alter the scientific environment. 
II.  CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
A conflict of interest is defined as “circumstances that create a risk that 
professional judgments or actions regarding a primary interest will be undu-
ly influenced by a secondary interest.”25  Put simply, a conflict of interest 
poses a threat to the integrity of the research.26 
Traditionally, the guiding motivations for PIs include: “faculty ad-
vancement, recognition by peers, the need to publish, to win research fund-
ing, and most importantly, to prove medicine’s ability to assuage pain and 
 
25. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MED. RESEARCH, 
EDUCATION, AND PRACTICE 1, 6 (Bernard Lo & Marilyn J. Field eds., 2009). (2009). 
26. S. Van McCrary, et al., A National Survey of Policies on Disclosure of Conflicts of 
Interest in Biomedical Research, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1621, 1621 (2000); see also John E. 
Tyler III, Advancing University Innovation: More Must be Expected-More Must be Done, 10 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 143, 158 (2008-09) (“Critics argue that university-industry interac-
tions compromise objectivity and that industry will try to unduly influence research topics, 
methods, results, and even the substantive reports themselves.”). 
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suffering.”27  These are strong forces and have served to incentivize bio-
medical discovery and scientific advancement well.28  That said, however, 
money is a motivator as well and the potential for money to conflict with 
the traditional motivations is real and should be addressed.29 
Some argue that academic physicians and scientists will not be influ-
enced by financial incentives because they are trained to be objective.30  
Further, the reputational scars that could result from being deemed non-
objective might keep scientists from being unduly influenced.  With this 
said, however, scientists are human and it is clear that they can be influ-
enced by external factors, despite all of their training.31  Academic science 
is a stressful endeavor.  An appreciation of the stressful environment is crit-
ical to understanding how PIs may make a decision that creates a conflict of 
interest.  Described below are examples of the environmental pressures ex-
perienced by PIs. 
A. Pressures on PIs 
PIs work under stressful conditions.  Such stresses include funding, 
publishing, promotion, and recognition.  Within each of these categories ex-
ist opportunities for decisions that may create potential financial conflicts of 
interest. 
1. Funding 
PIs must obtain funding in order to survive.  Funding pays for salary, 
lab space, research, and other overhead costs.  To obtain funding, PIs apply 
for grants and compete for research money in a competitive atmosphere.  
Although funding may be available through several sources, an RO1 grant 
from the NIH remains the gold-standard for funding.32  The RO1 is one of 
the largest grants available to a PI.33 
Over the years, the amount of money available through the RO1 grant 
program has stagnated.34  Scientists worry that the amount of funding dedi-
cated to RO1s will not increase and that money may be moved from the 
 
27. Hamilton Moses & Joseph B. Martin, Academic Relationships with Industry, 285 
JAMA 933, 935 (2001); see also, Korn, supra note 23, at 2234. 
28. Moses & Martin, supra note 27, at 935. 
29. Cf. Shira Lipton et al., supra note 1, 94. 
30. Kassirer, supra note 6, at 153. 
31. Id. 
32. US Health Bill Promises Changes for Biomedical Researchers, 464 NATURE 479, 
479 (2010) [hereinafter Changes for Biomedical Researchers] (quoting Mark Lively as stat-
ing that the RO1 is the “gold standard.”). 
33. See NIH Research Grant Program (RO1) (Feb. 2, 2011), 
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/funding/r01.htm. 
34. Changes for Biomedical Researchers, supra note 32, at 479 (quoting Mark Lively as 
stating that “there has already been a long slide or stagnation in the funding” of RO1s.). 
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RO1 pool to other areas.  This will lead to greater competition for funding 
because the amount of available money will decrease. 
The recent and historic health-care bill contains provisions that impact 
biomedical research; by increasing funding for the translation of discoveries 
in basic science to the clinic.35  The funding required to support these new 
provisions remains unclear, but some worry that it will cut into an already 
stretched NIH budget.36 
Movement in this direction creates several situations that can increase 
work-related stress.  First, PIs may now need to compete harder in an al-
ready competitive market for government funding.  Second, a push for the 
translation of basic science into therapies may create pressures for PIs to try 
to get as many of their discoveries into clinical trials as soon as possible, 
which may not always be desirable due to inadequate understanding at the 
basic science level. 
The pressure on PIs to fund research and pay laboratory personnel can 
create an environment ripe for financial conflicts of interest.  With tighten-
ing federal and state budgets, PIs may turn to private sources for funding.37  
Funding by private sources, however, may come with attendant strings, 
such as control of study design, delay of publication, and restrictions on 
collaborations with other laboratories.  The purpose of these restrictions 
may allow the private funding source to maintain control and privacy over 
studies to apply for patents or for other business-related reasons.  These re-
strictions may have negative impacts on the advancement of science. 
2. Publishing 
Academics publish to communicate ideas.  Publications are also impor-
tant for career advancement.  Scientific publications are peer-reviewed.  
The peer-review of manuscripts allows the scientific community to self-
regulate and build consensus.  That is, academics review each other’s ar-
ticles to determine what data is published.  Once an article is peer-reviewed 
and accepted for publication, this signals that the PI’s work is contributing 
to the scientific community. 
 
35. Changes for Biomedical Researchers, supra note 32, at 479; Jocelyn Kaiser, Health 
Bill Backs Evidence-Based Medicine, New Drug Studies, 327 SCIENCE 1562 (2010). 
36. Changes for Biomedical Researchers, supra note 32, at 479; Kaiser, supra note 35, 
at 1562. 
37. In recognition of the rise of conflicts of interest, the new health-care bill addresses 
the financial conflicts of interest that may arise for physicians.  The new health-care bill, 
however, does nothing to address the financial conflicts of interest that may arise with the 
basic scientists. Changes for Biomedical Researchers, supra note 32, at 479 (“Another pro-
vision in the bill will expose relationships between physician researchers and the medical 
industry.”); Kaiser, supra note 35, at 1562; see also, Physicians Payment Sunshine Act 
Guide, PEW PRESCRIPTION PROJECT, http://www.prescriptionproject.org/sunshine_act (last 
visited July 21, 2011) (using links to describe problems with small gifts and legislation ad-
dressing this area). 
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a. Influence in the Publishing Landscape 
The pressure to publish, however, may make PIs susceptible to industry 
publishing tactics when the PIs are involved in an industry-funded research 
project.  Private companies may have a different motivation for publishing.  
For example, private companies may want to influence the direction of 
science in such a way that their profit-seeking motive is met.  One way a 
private company may operate, for example, is to flood the literature with 
data in non-peer reviewed journals that may lead the science in a particular 
direction.38  A study analyzed the conclusions of a number of review ar-
ticles that reviewed the current literature on the effects, if any, of passive 
smoking.39  This study found that approximately a third of the review ar-
ticles concluded that passive smoking is not harmful.40  The main correla-
tion found in the articles that concluded that passive smoking is not harmful 
was that the authors were affiliated with the tobacco industry.41  The study 
suggests that the private tobacco industry may be attempting to influence 
the dialogue on the effects of passive smoking by flooding the literature 
with statements that say as much.42  The tobacco-industry tactics are dis-
cussed more fully below.  A major problem with this is that the authors of 
these review articles, in large part, did not disclose their industry ties; thus, 
they did not explicitly appear to have financial motives.43 
Another technique used by industry is to over-report or overstate favor-
able results.44  A study comparing the results of new studies of cancer drugs 
revealed that studies funded by pharmaceutical companies were more likely 
to reach favorable qualitative results than studies funded by non-profit insti-
 
38. Kassirer, supra note 6, at 156 (“In analyses of review articles, new treatments were 
favored over traditional ones more frequently when the manufacturer of the new drug funded 
the research.  Articles in symposiums sponsored by a single drug company were substantial-
ly more favorable to the drug than articles without company support.”). 
39. Richard Smith, Conflicts of Interest: How Money Clouds Objectivity, 99 J. OF THE 
ROYAL SOC’Y OF MED. 292, 293 (2006) (describing study). 
40. Id. at 293 (describing study).  Note: review articles are not peer-reviewed. 
41. Id. (describing study). 
42. Id. (describing study); see also Joanna K. Sax, Protecting Scientific Integrity: The 
Commercial Speech Doctrine Applied to Industry Publications, 37 AM. J. L. & MED. 203, 
210-11 (2011) (see references therein). 
43. Smith, supra note 39, at 293 (describing study). Another example of controlling the 
literature can be found where the pharmaceutical company is controlling the protocol to test 
for adverse effects.  In a tort case, for example, the expert witness will not be allowed to tes-
tify if their method is not generally accepted by the scientific community.  But, if the scien-
tific community has a vested interest in the result, then this detracts from the ability of scien-
tists to serve as expert witnesses. 
44. Likewise, industry may underreport or suppress evidence.  Cf. Wendy Wagner & 
David Michaels, Equal Treatment for Regulatory Science: Extending the Controls Govern-
ing the Quality of Public Research to Private Research, 30 AM. J. L. & MED. 119, 122 
(2004). 
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tutions.45  Likewise, studies funded by pharmaceutical companies were less 
likely to reach unfavorable conclusions regarding the cancer drug than stu-
dies funded by non-profit institutions.46  A number of reasons may lead to 
these results.  For example, pharmaceutical companies are unlikely to carry 
out full studies unless the preliminary data look promising.47  Regardless, 
the bias of reporting positive or favorable qualitative results may flood the 
literature and influence the direction of science.48 
In many ways the influence that a pharmaceutical company attempts to 
exert through scientific publications is similar to the activities of an interest 
group.  As an analogy, the tobacco industry devoted an enormous amount 
of money and energy into attacking and attempting to undermine scientific 
data regarding the harmful effects of smoking.49  To promote its agenda, the 
tobacco industry employed numerous strategies to suppress unfavorable re-
search and promote its own conclusions.50  One strategy employed was in-
dustry-sponsored research.51  The tobacco industry funded research that was 
disseminated via symposiums, research publications, and industry-
sponsored review articles.52  For example, a study found that “[t]obacco in-
dustry-funded reviews were about ninety times as likely as reviews funded 
by any other source to conclude that passive smoking was not harmful.”53  
The tobacco industry effectively flooded the market with tobacco-industry 
funded research to promote its own position.  These activities were unco-
vered through litigation.54  Investigation into the industry-sponsored tobac-
co literature revealed that lawyers and executives had a heavy hand in the 
design, dissemination and promotion of tobacco research.55  An important 
 
45. Mark Friedberg, et al., Evaluation of Conflict of Interest in Economic Analyses of 
New Drugs Used in Oncology, 282 JAMA 1453, 1455 (1999).  Of note, the Friedberg study 
was funded by an unrestricted grant from Amgen, Inc. and Amgen had a contractual right to 
review and comment on the manuscript and abstract prior to publication. 
46. Id. at 1455; cf. Wagner & Michaels, supra note 44, at 124 (“Evidence that parties 
with direct conflicts of interest can sometimes design and report results in ways that are fa-
vorable to their interests, rather than in ways that best represent the research, has been exten-
sively documented.”). 
47. See id. 
48. Cf. Wagner & Michaels, supra note 44, at 120 (“As long as sponsors control the re-
search at some or all points in the research process, adverse results can be suppressed and the 
design and reporting of experiments can be biased in ways that produce results that support 
the sponsor’s interests, rather than offer a disinterested examination of potential harms.”). 
49. Lisa A. Bero, Tobacco Industry Manipulation of Research, 120 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 
200, 200-01 (2005); see also, Sax, supra note 42, at 210-11 (see references therein). 
50. Id. at 201-05. 
51. Id. at 201. 
52. Id. at 202-03. 
53. Id. at 203. 
54. Id. at 201. 
55. Id. at 206.  Another example of this type of industry control is the story of under-
standing lead toxicity.  KRIMSKY, supra note 8, at 190 (“Needleman realized that much of 
the research on lead toxicity was paid for and controlled by the industry ‘who had a tight 
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lesson to learn here is that the private sector has a business motive and 
sometimes that business motive will conflict with what is best for the pub-
lic. 
Delay of publication is another problem.  Often, industry may want a 
contractual provision with a PI that allows industry to delay publication of 
methods or results so that industry can keep results private until a patent 
application is on file.56  Among the many problems with delaying publica-
tion is that it is diametrically opposed to the canon of sharing results among 
PIs.  Sharing is essential to the advancement of science.57  This is the anti-
thesis of academic culture, where wide dissemination of research is encour-
aged to promote science, create collaborations, and stimulate scientific 
progress. 
b. Ghostwriting 
Ghostwriting, “a practice that, in its most extreme form, involves phar-
maceutical companies designing and paying for studies or reviews, then 
seeking a guest author to be credited while the company goes unacknow-
ledged,”58 is a problem because ghostwritten papers tend to advocate posi-
tive conclusions, suggesting a bias, and are used to market drugs.59  If a pa-
per is authored by a pharmaceutical study promoting its own drugs, the ex-
experienced reader may view the results with skepticism because the reader 
knows that the pharmaceutical company has a vested financial interest in 
promoting the use of its drugs.  If, however, a reader reviews the same ar-
ticle, but it is authored by an academic scientist, the reader will not have the 
same skepticism because the academic scientist carries a reputation for ob-
jectivity and should not have the same vested financial interest as the phar-
maceutical company in promoting the use of any one drug.60 
A PI may accept an offer to ghostwrite for a number of reasons.  First, 
the pharmaceutical company may offer to pay the PI money.  Second, the PI 
 
grip on what the public was permitted to know.’  He decided he had to study the issues on its 
own terms without influence from the industry that profits from lead.”). 
56. Eyal Press & Jennifer Washburn, The Kept University, 285 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 39, 
41 (2000) (“Today scientists who perform industry-sponsored research routinely sign agree-
ments requiring them to keep both the methods and the results of their work secret for a cer-
tain period of time.”); KRIMSKY, supra note 8, at 15, 37, 82 (providing an example of the 
contract containing a provision that no data can be published without written consent from 
the company). 
57. KRIMSKY, supra note 8, at 83. 
58. Nicola Jones, Ghosts Still Present in the Medical Machine, 461 NATURE 325, 325 
(2009). 
59. Id. (“[G]hostwritten papers tend to have more positive conclusions and can be used 
to market off-label uses of drugs.”). 
60. See, e.g., Kassirer, supra note 6, at 156 (2001) (describing a researcher who was a 
ghostwriter on an article regarding obesity who admitted: “I think I’ve been pretty honest 
and uncorrupted by money.  But who knows, maybe it’s so insidious that I don’t notice it.”). 
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may need additional publications because the PI is facing a promotion and 
additional publications will help their chance of promotion.  Third, it may 
be likely that the results of the study will be published in a high-impact 
journal, subsequently increasing the PI’s reputation. 
The problem is that ghostwriting does not promote the public good.  An 
article promoting the use of a particular drug may receive increased press 
and increased use in the clinic because an academic PI authors an article 
containing favorable conclusions that are inaccurate.61  The PI may not have 
been involved with the design study or analysis.  Put simply, ghostwriting 
can have the unwanted effect of allowing industry to influence the trajecto-
ry of science,62 thereby creating a bias.63 
A recent study exposed the practice of pharmaceutical companies hiring 
public relations firms that specialize in producing, planning and tracking 
articles.64  A pharmaceutical company can hire a public relations-type firm 
to institute strategic planning for publication and potentially influence the 
medical and scientific community.  As part of the pharmaceutical compa-
ny’s strategic plans, they may fund academics, but this funding comes with 
strings, such as allowing the pharmaceutical company to prepare drafts, 
edit, delay publication, and prevent full access to data.65  The PI’s name 
may appear on the article as the author, but much of the work is controlled 
by the profit-seeking pharmaceutical company.  The private sector can in-
fluence the trajectory of science by flooding the market and by spinning re-
sults. 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, some journal editors cracked down 
on the practice of ghostwriting.66  The Journal of the American Medical As-
sociation (“JAMA”), for example, attempts to eliminate ghost authors by 
 
61. See S. Rep. No. 112-11, at 48 (2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-112srpt11/pdf/CRPT-112srpt11.pdf (“The researchers 
also reported that Merck hired a medical publishing company, Scientific Therapeutics In-
formation, Inc., to draft manuscripts for the company’s Vioxx studies and seek academic in-
vestigators to sign on as the primary author(s), even though the academic investigators may 
not be intimately familiar with the underlying data and/or relevant documentation.  This is a 
practice known as ghostwriting.  Information in scientific journals can have a significant im-
pact on doctors’ prescribing behavior and, in turn, on the taxpayer because Medicare and 
Medicaid pay billions of dollars for prescription drugs.  Patients may be harmed if doctors 
are being misled to prescribe drugs that may not work or are unsafe.”). 
62. Sergio Sismondo, Ghost Management: How Much of the Medical Literature is 
Shaped Behind the Scenes by the Pharmaceutical Industry?, 4 PLOS MED. 1429, 1429 
(2007). 
63. Id. at 1429. 
64. Id. at 1430; see also, KRIMSKY, supra note 8, at 115 (“It works like this: Excerpta is 
contracted by a company to fine a distinguished academic scholar to agree to have his or her 
name placed on a commentary, editorial, review, or research article, which has been written 
by someone either from the company or someone selected by Excerpta.”). 
65. Sismondo, supra note 62, at 1430. 
66. Jones, supra note 58, at 325. 
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requiring that “industry-affiliated papers must undergo an independent sta-
tistical review.”67  Other journals, however, do not explicitly address the 
problem of ghostwriting.68  Some journals have adopted policies that re-
quire authors to disclose any potential financial conflicts of interest.69  The 
practice of ghostwriting can be eliminated if PIs refuse offers from drug 
companies that request ghost-authorship. 
Over time, the application of scientific rigor may ferret out some of the 
issues raised above.  Scientists often attempt to replicate earlier experiments 
and if problems arise, previously published research may be exposed as not 
being able to be replicated.70  It seems highly unlikely, however, that all 
publication bias can be exposed through this traditional mechanism; rather, 
other institutional remedies are needed.  One way to do this is to create in-
centives to promote certain types of human behavior. 
3. Promotion and Recognition 
Other pressures on PIs include promotion and recognition.  PIs un-
dergo a review process every few years.  As part of the review process, the 
faculty member’s department will review a PI’s publication record as well 
as other contributions to the medical community. 71  Leading up to a review, 
the PI will prepare a summary of his or her achievements.  In addition, 
some reviews may require letters of recommendation from faculty outside 
the PI’s institution. 
Although the pressures of promotion and recognition can pose a 
non-financial conflict of interest with a PI’s primary academic responsibili-
ties; in general, academic policies and the academic culture effectively 
 
67. Nicola Jones, Spectre of Industry Bias, 461 NATURE 325, 325 (2009); see also Ca-
therine D. DeAngelis, et al., Reporting Financial Conflict of Interest and Relationships Be-
tween Investigators and Research Sponsors, 286 JAMA 89, 89 (2001). In addition to ghost-
writing, JAMA has stringent publication rules to address conflicts of interest.  See Phil B. 
Fontanarosa, et al., Reporting Conflicts of Interest, Financial Aspects of Research, and Role 
of Sponsors in Funded Studies, 294 JAMA 110, 110-111 (2005); Annette Flanagin, et al., 
Update on JAMA’s Conflict of Interest Policy, 296 JAMA 220-21 (2006). 
68. Jones, supra note 58, at 325 (“[O]nly 4 of 26 journals she studied explicitly mention 
ghostwriting in their policies today.”). 
69. Uniform Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals: Ethical 
Considerations in the Conduct and Reporting of Research: Conflicts of Interest, ICMJE, 
http://www.icmje.org/ethical_4conflicts.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2011). 
70. See KRIMSKY, supra note 8, at 77. 
71. Jesse A. Goldner, Dealing with Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: IRB 
Oversight as the Next Best Solution to the Abolitionist Approach, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
379, 384 (2000); see also Donald S. Siegel, David Waldman, & Albert Link, Assessing the 
Impact of Organizational Practices on the Relative Productivity of University Technology 
Transfer Offices: An Exploratory Study, 32 RES. POL’Y 27, 43 (2003) (“The vast majority of 
interviewees also specifically commented on the fact that tenure and promotion decisions 
continued to be made almost strictly on the basis of publications and grants.”). 
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manage these non-financial conflicts of interest.72  Indeed, while these types 
of conflicts are acknowledged within academia, they do not receive much 
attention in the public because scientific processes and the scientific com-
munity itself do a good job of managing non-financial conflicts of interest.73 
B. Founders and Equity Interest 
The public-private interaction also occurs as a result of PIs founding 
their own companies to develop discoveries.74  For example, in the mid-
1990s a psychiatrist and his colleagues discovered a new way of treating 
psychotic depression by giving patients RU-486.75  The psychiatrist con-
ducted a clinical study and applied for a patent.  When the pharmaceutical 
industry showed no interest in developing this treatment, the psychiatrist 
co-founded his own company to license his discovery.76  It is possible that 
the psychiatrist may face a conflict of interest because the psychiatrist now 
stands to gain financially only if his discovery does well.  If the psychiatrist 
is involved in additional clinical studies using his discovery, the psychiatrist 
has a financial interest in seeing that the trials obtain positive results.  Any 
equity interest, where the value of that interest may depend on the outcome 
of a discovery, may then operate as a conflict of interest.77 
Perhaps one of the most well-known financial conflict of interest exam-
ples is the case of Jesse Gelsinger at the University of Pennsylvania.  Jesse, 
a volunteer in a clinical trial, died in a gene therapy trial.  Both the lead in-
vestigator and the University of Pennsylvania owned equity in a company 
involved in the study.78  After an investigation, the FDA concluded that 
Jesse’s liver was not functioning at the minimum level in order to partici-
pate in the study in the first place.79  In addition, the researchers failed to 
report severe side effects experienced by other subjects, which would have 
resulted in halting the study.80  The literature on this subject suggests that 
 
72. See Korn, supra note 23, at 2234. 
73. Id. 
74. Goldner, supra note 11, at 384.  In fact, the university may even encourage the PI to 
found a start-up company.  Kassirer, supra note 6, at 152 (“They point out that the several 
research and technology institutes that have encouraged their faculty to develop start-up 
companies have not only successfully retained superb faculty, but (according to them) have 
avoided potentially serious adverse consequences of these relationships.”). 
75. Jocelyn Kaiser, Private Money, Public Disclosure, 325 SCIENCE 28, July 3, 2009, at 
28. 
76. Id. 
77. See Hamilton Moses III & Joseph B. Martin, Academic Relationships with Industry, 
285 JAMA 933, 934 (2001). 
78. Kaiser, supra note 75, at 29 (“[A] volunteer died in 1999 in a gene therapy trial in 
which the lead investigator and university had a financial interest[.]”); Goldner, supra note 
11, at 379. 
79. Goldner, supra note 11, at 379. 
80. Id. 
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the potential financial gain by both the lead investigator and the University 
of Pennsylvania if the trial was successful may have clouded the judgment 
of those conducting the study.81 
PIs may also obtain equity interests in companies because the compa-
nies want PIs to serve as consultants and on their boards, as the PIs are 
usually among the brightest scientists and they may be most familiar with 
the technology.82  Again, due to the equity interest, the PIs have a financial 
interest in seeing that the company succeeds, which could cloud judgment. 
C. Intellectual Property Law 
Changes in intellectual property (“IP”) law may contribute to some of 
the problems inherent to conflicts of interest.  In 1980, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Diamond v. Charkrabarty provided that genetically modified 
bacteria are patentable.83  This opened the door to allow the patenting of 
cell lines, genes, and other living organisms.84  In essence, a new market 
was created for the biomedical enterprise.  Of course, the Bayh-Dole Act 
was also passed in 1980, creating a perfect storm that considerably in-
creased the commercialization of science. 
It has been recognized that university patenting sharply increased after 
the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act.85  It has also been questioned whether 
the taxpayers, who fund a large part of the research resulting in patents, are 
getting a good return on their investment, either financially or socially.86 
IP policy is important in the public-private interaction.  Patent protec-
tion is not available for discoveries that have been made public.  For this 
reason, universities and the private sector may want PIs to refrain from pub-
lishing results of experiments until a patent application is filed.  This inter-
feres with collaborations among scientists, impedes research, and delays in-
formation from reaching the public.  On the other hand, IP policy creates 
incentives for the private sector to invest in R&D and then reap the benefits 
of the exclusivity period granted by patent protection.  Changes in IP law 
with respect to discoveries in the biomedical sciences, which is discussed in 
section V.F., may be needed to address the problems associated with the 
creation of conflicts of interest. 
In sum, the combination of the pressures of academic success and the 
increased influence of the private sector on academic science creates a 
 
81. See also, Kassirer, supra note 6, at 154 (describing that the “press has also ferreted 
out many financial conflicts of interest by physicians” including one related to a diabetes 
drug). 
82. Id. at 152. 
83. KRIMSKY, supra note 8, at 30; see also Diamond v. Charkrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 
(1980). 
84. KRIMSKY, supra note 8, at 30. 
85. Id. at 32. 
86. Id. 
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swamp for problems with conflicts of interest.  The private money is impor-
tant to fund academic research, but the influx of private money creates the 
potential for conflicts of interest.  A policy is needed that recognizes and 
supports the use of private money in academic research, but creates appro-
priate incentives to minimize and potentially eliminate the creation of con-
flicts of interest. 
III.  THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF DISCLOSURE 
A. Disclosure as the Current Process Used to Address Conflicts of Interest 
The cornerstone of current policies aimed at controlling conflicts of in-
terest is disclosure.87  Mandated disclosure is an often-used first step to-
wards regulation because it does not mandate specific outcomes and allows 
parties to retain freedom in transactions.88  In addition, mandated disclo-
sures only apply to parties that have entered into a transaction.89 
The NIH proposed guidelines that would prohibit any relationship that 
might present a conflict after noting the increased public-private interaction 
created by the Bayh-Dole Act90 and the potential for conflicts of interest 
that impact the integrity of scientific research.91  These proposed guidelines 
were widely viewed as too restrictive.92  In 1994, the Public Health Service 
and the National Science Foundation proposed revised guidelines that 
promulgated rules for PIs to report financial payments.  These were adopted 
in 1995.93  Under the rules enacted in 1995, academics must report to the 
funding agency any industry payments of $10,000 or more if the payments 
would reasonably appear to affect the research for which the PI is apply-
ing.94  Grant applicants must also report equity holdings above five percent 
 
87. See David B. Allison, Letter, The Antidote to Bias in Research, 326 SCIENCE 522, 
522 (2009) (describing how some scientists question the value of disclosure policies); see 
also Daylian M. Cain & Allan S. Detsky, Everyone’s a Little Bit Biased (Even Physicians), 
299 JAMA 2893, 2894-5 (2008) (describing experiments where disclosure had the opposite 
of the intended effect and how disclosure may not be the solution). 
88. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES CENTER 23-4 (2010), 
available at http://law.bepress.com/umichlwps/empirical/art9/. 
89. See id. at 24. 
90. See generally, Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 1671-95 (describing the history of the 
current policy). 
91. Van McCrary et al., supra note 26, at 1621. 
92. Id. at 1621; see also, Korn, supra note 23, at 2235. 
93. Responsibility of Applicants for Promoting Objectivity in Research for Which PHS 
Funding is Sought, 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.601-50.607 (2010). 
94. Editorial, Trust, but Verify, 461 NATURE 315, 315 (2009) (“Under conflict-of-
interest rules in place since 1995, extramural grant applicants must report industry payments 
of more than US$10,000 per year if those payments would ‘reasonably appear to be affected 
by the research’ for which NIH funding is sought.”); Kaiser, supra note 75, at 29; see also 
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ownership in a company.95  The home institution is charged, in its discre-
tion, with managing or eliminating any financial conflict of interest and re-
porting back to the NIH.96  In 2010, the NIH changed its guidelines so that 
grant applicants must disclose if they receive industry payments of $5,000 
or more and if the PI holds any equity in a non-publicly traded company.97 
Similar to the NIH, many universities mandate disclosure in their con-
flict of interest policies.98  Some universities may have specific rules 
beyond disclosure.  Harvard University, for example, recently enacted 
guidelines that doctors who serve on the board of directors for drug makers 
cannot be paid more than $5,000 per day.99  Further, under these guidelines, 
doctors are not supposed to receive equity for their services.100 
Recent investigations charged that many PIs and home institutions may 
be lax with respect to reporting requirements.101  To address this, Senator 
Grassley (R-Iowa) proposed legislation to strengthen the reporting require-
ments.102  The proposed legislation, however, only applies to clinical physi-
cians, not to non-clinical scientists.103 
B. Problems with Disclosure 
The current policy of disclosure does not appear to work well.  First, 
disclosure does not prevent PIs from entering into agreements where a con-
 
Responsibility of Applicants for Promoting Objectivity in Research for Which PHS Funding 
is Sought, 42 CFR §§ 50.604(c)(1). 
95. Trust, but Verify, supra note 94, at 315; Kaiser, supra note 75, at 28; Responsibility 
of Applicants for Promoting Objectivity in Research for Which PHS Funding is Sought, 42 
CFR §§ 50.604(c)(1); Van McCrary et al., supra note 26, at 1621. 
96. Trust, but Verify, supra note 94, at 315 (2009); Van McCrary, et al., supra note 26, 
at 1621. 
97. Jocelyn Kaiser, Lowering the Boom on Financial Conflicts, 328 SCIENCE 1065, 1091 
(2010); Meredith Waldman, NIH Set to Tighten Financial Rules for Researchers, 465 
NATURE 391, 407 (2010). 
98. See generally, Mildred K. Cho, et al., Policies on Faculty Conflicts of Interest at US 
Universities, 284 JAMA 2203, 2203-08 (2000). 
99. Scott Hensley, Harvard Hospitals Limit Industry Pay to Doctors, NPR’S HEALTH 
BLOG (Jan. 4, 2010, 8:55 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2010/01/harvard_hospitals_ 
limit_indust.html. The author thanks a previous student for sending along this reference. See 
also Duff Wilson, Harvard Teaching Hospitals Cap Outside Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2010, 
at A1. 
100. Hensley, supra note 99; Wilson, supra note 99. 
101. Trust, Trust, but Verify, supra note 94, at 315 (“After much investigation, however, 
Grassley and his staff have alleged that some academic researchers have taken a relaxed ap-
proach to this reporting requirement, and that some institutions have been just as casual in 
monitoring their researchers.”). See generally, Meredith Wadman, The Senator’s Sleuth, 461 
NATURE 330, 330-334 (2009). 
102. Trust, but Verify, supra note 94, at 315. 
103. Id. (“It’s important to note that Grassley’s Sunshine Act does not apply to non-
physician scientists; he drafted it with medication-prescribing doctors in mind. Yet PhD 
scientists, too, play a vital part in many industry collaborations.”). 
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flict of interest exists in the first place.  Second, PIs may have difficulty un-
derstanding their home institution’s policy regarding disclosure.104  Third, 
disclosure does not address the underlying stressful environment that lends 
itself to decisions to enter into agreements where a conflict of interest may 
arise.  Finally, disclosure is a limited policy solution. 
Recent scholarship analyzes the problematic nature of mandated disclo-
sure in a variety of settings, including mortgage lending, informed consent, 
drug labeling, and financial transactions.105  In other fields, disclosure is 
supposed to create ability to make better informed decisions.  The same 
idea may be applied to scientific publications, for example, where disclo-
sure of a funding source allows the reader to assess the credibility of results.  
Internal disclosure within the university or to the NIH does not have the 
same objective as mandated disclosure in other fields.  With this limitation, 
however, disclosure does not appear adequate to effectively manage con-
flicts of interest for reasons that are common to other industries and for rea-
sons unique to biomedical research as well. Although mandated disclosure 
appears to be an easy information-sharing approach to regulation, it often 
does not effectively address the problems it is aimed at solving.106  For 
these reasons, academic conflict of interest policies suffer from many of the 
same shortcomings of the use of mandated disclosures in other areas of the 
law; hence, policy recommendations and reform need to appropriately ad-
dress financial conflicts of interest in the academic setting. 
C. Problems with Creating an Effective Policy 
Any policy recommendations must consider the process of biomedical 
research.  An absence of understanding of the system can lead to remedies 
and policies that both undermine and damage the scientific process and any 
goal of translating basic scientific discoveries into actual medical treat-
ment.107  In addition, when crafting a policy, an understanding of how aca-
demic scientists respond to situations in which a conflict might arise is es-
sential.  To this end, my colleague and I conducted an empirical study of 
faculty responses to hypothetical situations in which a conflict of interest 
 
104. See, e.g., Shira Lipton et al., supra note 1, at 90. 
105. See generally, Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, supra note 88; see also Max 
H. Brazerman, Behavioral Decision Research, Legislation, and Society: Three Cases, 2 
CAPITALISM & SOC’Y 1, 4 (2007) (describing how the SEC’s policy of disclosure of conflicts 
of interest is ineffective). 
106. See DAYLIAN M. CAIN, GEORGE LOWENSTEIN, AND DON A. MOORE, Coming Clean 
by Playing Dirtier, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 104, at 104  (Don A. Moore, Daylian M. Cain, 
George Lowenstein & Max H. Bazerman eds., Cambridge University Press 2005) (discuss-
ing problems associated with disclosure of conflicts of interest). 
107. Korn, supra note 23, at 2234 (“Absence of context can lead to proposed remedies 
that could damage both the scientific process and the translation of scientific discoveries into 
public health.”). 
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may arise.108  The results of this study are described in section IV.C. be-
low.109 
The university may face its own internal conflict when establishing any 
conflict of interest policies.  On the one hand, any policy that restricts con-
flicts of interest may lead to less funding by the private sector.110  Less 
money makes it harder to conduct research.  On the other hand, publicity of 
conflicts of interest that lead to terrible results, such as the Jesse Gelsinger 
case, are not only tragic, but also poor public relations for the university and 
hurt the public trust of academic institutions. 
In addition, if a conflict of interest exists, it can undermine the inherent 
culture of academic science, that is, the normative structure.111  The aca-
demic culture is a free exchange of ideas, openness, pursuit of truth, and na-
ture, not religion or culture, is the final word on the physical universe.112  
The pursuit of truth may be in jeopardy if industry money is devaluing the 
academic culture. 
Academic PIs are immersed in the private industry.  At leading research 
universities many PIs consult with industry, sit on boards, own equity, and 
are funded by private companies.113  It makes sense that private companies 
want the best and the brightest scientists to provide advice and conduct re-
search.  The issue is whether this is good for scientific integrity and the 
public.  The lack of clear policies within an institution combined with non-
uniform policies across medical centers leads to confusion.  Current policies 
appear to vary regarding disclosure, review, monitoring and management.114  
In sum, no consistent or effective policy exists to address financial conflicts 
of interest. 
IV.  BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 
Behavioral law and economics can be utilized to create an effective 
conflict of interest policy.  Recent scholarship proposes the incorporation of 
behavioral decision-making into legal analysis.115  In the conflict of interest 
 
108. Joanna K. Sax & Neal Doran, Evaluation of Academic Scientists’ Responses to Sit-
uations that Pose a Conflict of Interest, 12 CANCER BIOLOGY & THERAPY 4, 4-8 (2011). 
109. Id. 
110. Krimsky, supra note 8, at 47. 
111. Id. at 73. 
112. Id. 
113. See id. at 111; see also Press & Washburn, supra note 56, at 47 (“The surprising 
twist, however, is that although university licensing offices are churning out patents, most of 
these offices are themselves barely breaking even.”). 
114. Cho et al., supra note 98, at 2207. 
115. Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law’s Leverage: Beha-
vioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1141, 1142 (2001) 
(“‘[B]ehavioral law and economics’ (here “BLE”) reflect[s] a new interdisciplinary approach 
that would incorporate into legal analysis important findings about irrationality from the 
field of cognitive psychology (and its cognates variously known as behavioral economics 
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arena, the application of principles from psychology and biology can help 
policymakers understand decision-making, which can provide powerful in-
sight into creating effective policies.116 
Policy incentivizes humans to behave in a socially desirable way.117  In 
order to incentivize such behavior, one must first understand why humans 
behave the way they do and how they respond to different mechanisms.118  
This is often accomplished by either rewarding people for doing something 
socially or economically desirable, or extracting resources from people who 
do socially undesirable things.119  A classic example of a policy that encou-
rages a particular social behavior is the use of tax policy for charitable giv-
ing.  The government encourages charitable giving by offering a tax deduc-
tion.  Behavioral biology may help to explain why people will behave the 
way a policy model anticipates.120 
A. Behavioral Biology and Economics 
In essence, the law is about changing behavior.121  For this reason, un-
derstanding human behavior seems to be an important part of any policy.  
The problem, however, is that a complete explanation of the gamut of hu-
man behavior does not exist.122  This does not mean, however, that beha-
vioral biology cannot serve as part of the research that contributes to policy 
decisions.123 
Economics are often used to analyze or generate a policy decision.  In 
conjunction with economic analyses, behavioral biology can be utilized to 
understand how to implement a policy to obtain a desired outcome.  Beha-
vioral biology may help to identify hidden policy conflicts, expose a poor 
policy for the desired outcome, or support a particular policy implementa-
tion.124  At issue in the conflict of interest area, for example, could be a hid-
 
and behavioral decision theory).”); see also Owen D. Jones, Law, Emotions, and Behavioral 
Biology, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 283, 284 (1999) (discussing that behavioral biology holds prom-
ise for legal thinkers); see generally Brazerman, supra note 104, at 1. 
116. See Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 21, at 410 (“[E]volutionary insights into human 
decisionmaking processes can increase our understanding about people in ways useful to law 
and can also provide theoretical foundation for, and potential predictive power about, a va-
riety of human behaviors – including, for example, economically irrational behavior.”). 
117. See id. at 414, 500. 
118. See id. at 414. 
119. See id. at 472. 
120. See id. at 414. 
121. See id. at 422. 
122. See id. 
123. Brazerman, supra note 105, at 14 (“The problem is that other social sciences have 
advanced to the extent that we now know of systematic patterns when we can adjust eco-
nomic theory to make better predictions, yet decision-makers are not using this knowledge 
from other social sciences sufficiently.”). 
124. See id. at 14-15 (promoting use of social science in creating policy); see also Jones 
& Goldsmith, supra note 20, at 436 (“To the extent that behavioral biology can help uncover 
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den policy conflict where the Bayh-Dole Act encourages the public-private 
interaction yet fails to appropriately handle the financial conflicts of interest 
that arise from these relationships. 
This Article proposes that an understanding of the environment and 
human behavior when faced with decisions that may create a conflict of in-
terest is critical to any policy that governs conflicts of interest.  The deci-
sion to enter into a funding agreement is a part of behavioral biology.125  
For example, emotions may strongly influence a decision.126  In the conflict 
of interest arena, stress in the academic environment and a desire for recog-
nition could impact the decision to enter into a particular agreement for 
funding.127 
Some law and economic scholars are warming to the idea of consider-
ing behavioral biology as a component of policy analysis.128  Other law and 
economics scholars criticize the application of behavioral biology to policy 
decision-making.129 
Normatively, policymakers have a preference to bring about a certain 
behavior.  Policymakers must consider how they want to affect a certain 
behavior and also how hard it will be to effect the specific change.130  To do 
this, an understanding of the behavioral biology may lend assistance to de-
termine both the ‘how’ and the ‘how hard.’131 
B. Human Responses to Situations 
This article suggests approaches to conflicts of interest policies that al-
low funding opportunities by the private sector that do not create financial 
conflicts of interest.  To do this, it is important to understand how people 
respond to decisions with attached financial incentives.  For example, stu-
dies show that even a small amount of money may create conflict.132  This 
 
hidden policy conflicts, it can also help to clarify and to quantify the actual tradeoffs in-
volved in simultaneously pursuing two different legal goals that are in conflict.”). 
125. See Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 20, at 438 (“Yet another way to improve our 
understanding of human behavior is to improve our understanding of human decisionmak-
ing.”). 
126. See id. (“A broader and more accurate view is that emotions and reasoning each 
effect the other.”). 
127. See id. at 449 (“Consider stress and its consequences. . . . In a different environ-
ment, however, where stress is caused through relatively long-lasting social interactions with 
members of the same species, relief becomes difficult.”). 
128. Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1471, 1471 (1998). 
129. Richard Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1551, 1552 (1998). 
130. See Jones & Goldsmith, supra note 20, at 470 (referring to tools and effort). 
131. See id. at 471. 
132. Troyen A. Brennan et al., Health Industry Practices that Create Conflicts of Inter-
est, 295 JAMA 429, 430-31 (2006). 
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phenomenon may be explained in a famous psychology study conducted by 
Leon Festinger and Merrill Carlsmith in 1959.133  In this study, subjects 
were asked to perform a series of boring tasks, such as turning pegs.  The 
subjects were divided into three groups: control, one dollar, and twenty dol-
lars.  Subjects who just performed the tasks were then asked to tell the sub-
jects who would next participate that they found the series of tasks to be in-
teresting.  For doing so, the original subjects were paid one dollar or twenty 
dollars, depending on their assigned group. 134  Those paid twenty dollars 
had no problem “lying” to the next subjects that the tasks were fun because 
they had a good reason, that is, they were paid twenty dollars.135  Those 
paid one dollar, however, experienced what is termed “cognitive disson-
ance,” which occurs when a person holds two thoughts that are psychologi-
cally inconsistent.136  Here, the subjects knew the tasks were exceedingly 
boring, but they received one dollar to tell the next subject that the tasks 
were fun.137  In this experiment, the one dollar group did tell the next sub-
jects that the tasks were fun and they would justify their actions to them-
selves by thinking that tediousness is in the eye of the beholder.138  This ex-
plains how the one dollar subjects brought together their inconsistent 
thoughts.139 
The theory of cognitive dissonance may apply to PIs who face scenarios 
that give rise to financial conflicts of interest.  That is, PIs may experience 
cognitive dissonance when faced with a decision to accept private money 
with strings attached.  It may be that PIs can justify accepting private mon-
ey, even though they may have to agree to delay publication or release the 
control of study design, because they need to financially support research 
and personnel.  The rise of private money supporting research creates a 
problem where PIs may have psychologically inconsistent thoughts, and 
similar to the experiment described above, they may need to rationalize in 
the same way the subjects paid one dollar did. 
Current conflict of interest policies do not consider human behavior in 
their regimes.140  For example, the NIH’s conflicts of interest guidelines 
state that financial investments or payments above a defined threshold must 
 
133. SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 23-25 
(Christopher Rogers & James R. Belser eds., McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1993) (describing study). 
134. Id. at 23-25 (describing study). 
135. Id. (describing study). 
136. Id. (describing study and also discussing “self-perception” as an alternative theory). 
137. Id. (describing study). 
138. Id. (describing study). 
139. Id. (describing study). 
140. This may be, in part, because of the difficulties associated with testing for ethical 
decision-making.  See Michael D. Mumford et al., Validation of Ethical Decision Making 
Measures: Evidence for a New Set of Measures, 16 ETHICS BEHAVIOR 319, 321 (2006). 
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be disclosed.141  But, as the experiment by Festinger and Carlsmith demon-
strates, even small payments can create cognitive dissonance. 
All of this is to say that the current attempts to address conflicts of in-
terest are inadequate because the policies do not address the constraints on 
human behavior, especially when experiencing chronic stress.142  The at-
mosphere of academic research is stressful.  As discussed above, PIs face 
stress regarding funding, publication, and promotion.  One reason that PIs 
may enter into situations that pose a conflict of interest is that PIs are hav-
ing to make decisions in a stressful environment. 
Work stressors are broken down into different categories.  First, a stres-
sor is a characteristic of the environment that is objectively verifiable.143  
For example, the pressure to publish X-number of peer-reviewed articles 
every three years is a stressor.  Second, stress is a subjective experience of 
the stressor.144  For example, how a PI responds to the stressor of having to 
publish X-number of peer-reviewed articles every three years depends on 
the individual PI.  Different PIs will experience the same stressor in differ-
ent ways.145  Third, the term strain is used to describe the outcome of the 
stress, for example, anxiety.146  Finally, chronic stressors do not have a fi-
nite duration, rather they are repetitive in nature.147  The demands of aca-
demic life, such as the need for recognition, concern for promotion, and the 
need for funding, place PIs in a chronically stressful environment.  This en-
vironment may impact how PIs make decisions when faced with situations 
that create a conflict of interest. 
For decades, scholars have studied the coping mechanisms employed in 
response to chronic stress.148  While multiple theories exist, studies show 
that individuals who experience greater workplace stress have a reduction in 
their problem-solving capabilities.149  Similar to other professions, PIs expe-
rience workplace stress.  The reduction of available public funding through 
grants creates an environment where PIs need to look to the private sector 
to finance their research.150  Moreover, the academic-private interaction is 
 
141. Kaiser, supra note 97, at 1091; Wadman, supra note 97, at 407. 
142. See generally, C. GAIL HEPBURN ET AL., COPING WITH CHRONIC STRESS 343-363 
(Benjamin H. Gottlieb ed., Plenum Press 1997); see also DOLLY CHUGH ET AL., CONFLICTS 
OF INTEREST 91 (Moore, et al. eds., Cambridge U. Press 2005) (discussing decision-making). 
143. HEPBURN ET AL., supra note 142, at 344. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 344-45 (providing career security as an example of a core chronic work stres-
sor). 
148. Id. at 352-53. 
149. Id. at 353. 
150. See Heidi Ledford, Drug Buddies, 474 NATURE 433, 433 (2011) (“Tightening fed-
eral budgets are also putting financial strains on academic labs, making industry collabora-
tions more attractive.”). 
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encouraged by federal policy.  The limitations of public funding increased 
the pressures on PIs, because they are still expected to perform at better and 
better levels.  It is also possible that some PIs may agree to terms with the 
private sector that they would not otherwise agree to, such as delaying pub-
lication in return for funding.  In the minds of some PIs, delaying publica-
tion seems like a small price to pay for funding that supports research, sala-
ry, and overhead costs.  And, on a limited basis, it may be a small price to 
pay, however industry’s control over PIs is increasing and is threatening 
scientific integrity. 
C. Empirical Study 
To understand how academic scientists respond to hypothetical situa-
tions in which a conflict of interest may exist, a colleague and I conducted 
the following empirical study.151  The faculty at five medical schools was 
requested to complete an anonymous on-line survey containing seven vig-
nettes describing hypothetical situations in which a conflict of interest may 
arise.152  The faculty was asked to respond to questions on a scale of 0-9, 
with 0 indicating the more appropriate response (i.e. least likely to enter in-
to a conflict).  The study hoped to address the following questions: (1) 
whether junior faculty may respond differently than senior faculty to ques-
tions posing a conflict of interest, suggesting that junior faculty may be less 
experienced or more susceptible to certain pressures; (2) whether faculty 
with primary research responsibilities respond differently than faculty with 
primary clinical responsibilities; and (3) whether responses from faculty in 
departments with higher amounts of federal grant money respond different-
ly than faculty in departments with lower amounts of federal grant mon-
ey.153  To analyze the results, the seven vignettes were then separated into 
four overlapping categories: (1) conflicts with pharmaceutical companies; 
(2) reporting of data; (3) scientific versus profit motive; and (4) promo-
tion.154 
We used Tobit regression models to analyze whether the mean res-
ponses to each vignette category differed by academic rank (i.e. junior ver-
sus senior), academic sector (i.e. clinical versus research) and home de-
partment federal grant money per faculty member.155  We found that senior 
faculty gave significantly lower (i.e. more appropriate) responses to each of 
the four categories of vignettes compared to junior faculty.156  The amount 
 
151. Sax & Doran, supra note 108, at 4-8.  (Note, our empirical study did not test deci-
sion-making). 
152. Id. at 5. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 5.  A copy of the vignettes is available upon request from the author. 
155. Id. at 5-6. 
156. Id. 
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of departmental grant money per faculty member also impacted responses.  
Faculty from departments with more federal grant money responded signif-
icantly higher (i.e. less appropriate) to vignettes in the categories of phar-
maceuticals, reporting of data and profit than faculty from departments with 
lower amounts of federal grant money.157  Except in the profit vignettes, 
responses from faculty with primary research responsibilities were not sig-
nificantly different from the response of faculty with primary clinical re-
sponsibilities.  One reason for this result may be the failure of the survey to 
adequately tease out the research from the clinical faculty since many de-
partments contain both types of faculty.158  Interestingly, the faculty mem-
bers’ mean responses varied depending on vignette type.159  For example, 
mean responses to vignettes concerning promotion were higher (i.e. less 
appropriate) than the mean responses to vignettes concerning pharmaceuti-
cals.  Our study is complementary to other studies that address the extent 
and type of financial relationships between industry and the academy.160 
The results of the empirical study can be used to assist in developing an 
effective policy that manages financial conflicts of interest.  The survey 
study begins to address an underlying problem that not all PIs respond in a 
uniform manner to questions posing potential conflicts of interest.  For ex-
ample, junior faculty responds differently than senior faculty.  One reason 
for this could be that the stressors placed on junior faculty are different than 
senior faculty or that junior faculty responds differently to stress than senior 
faculty.  This finding suggests that current ‘one-size fits all’ approaches to 
conflicts of interest policies may be inadequate.  Instead, policy proposals 
should consider that different faculty experience varying pressures (or stres-
sors) depending on experience, grant money, and primary responsibilities.  
To address these differences, universities might need to tailor training and 
education programs to these groups in order to bring everyone into com-
pliance with a strong conflict of interest policy.  In other words, education 
programs aimed at reducing the stress experienced by PIs – catered towards 
different phases of the PIs’ career (e.g. junior versus senior) – may be bene-
ficial.  Recent studies suggest that training may be an effective tool to curb 
 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 5-7. 
159. Id. at 6. 
160. Id. at 5, 7; see generally Eric G. Campbell et al., Looking a Gift Horse in the 
Mouth: Corporate Gifts Supporting Life Sciences Research, 279 JAMA 995 (1998) 
(examining the impact of research-related gifts from companies to scientists); see generally 
Eric G. Campbell et al., Institutional Academic-Industry Relationships, 298 JAMA 1779 
(2007) (examining institutional academic-industry relationships); see generally Eric G. 
Campbell et al., Financial Relationships Between Institutional Review Board Members and 
Industry, 355 N. ENGL. J. MED. 2321 (2006) (studying the financial relationships between 
academic institutional review board members and industry). 
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decision-making in specific circumstances, and these studies may be uti-
lized to determine whether such training programs are effective.161 
Discussed below are approaches to implementing effective conflict of 
interest policies that consider the psychology scholarship and the results 
from our empirical study.  In this vein, conflict of interest policies should 
consider that PIs experience a lot of stress, stress can cause inappropriate 
responses to situations in which conflicts may arise and any policy should 
consider how to incentivize PIs to respond appropriately either by creating a 
less-stressful environment or by helping PIs to understand how stress may 
impact their decision-making. 
V.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS THAT REQUIRE INSTITUTIONAL AND 
LEGAL ADJUSTMENTS 
A new policy that considers how the environment of the PIs may im-
pact how a PI approaches decision-making may be an effective way to ad-
dress conflicts of interest.  That is, the combination of the social sciences 
and economics can be used to create an effective policy.  For example, the 
results from our survey demonstrate that seniority, sector, and dependency 
on grant money may be factors that impact how faculty respond to hypo-
thetical situations in which a conflict of interest may arise.162  It may be that 
the environment of a junior faculty member is different than the environ-
ment of a senior faculty member.  Put differently, junior faculty may expe-
rience different stressors or experience stress differently than senior faculty.  
The current polices may not be effective because the policies do not consid-
er the environment in which PIs live.  Further, the Bayh-Dole Act encou-
rages an environment that fosters the creation of conflicts of interest.  To 
manage conflicts of interest, a policy must both consider the environment of 
PIs as well as the increased pressures they face to create and maintain inte-
ractions with the private sector. 
Described below are a number of policy recommendations to address 
conflicts of interest that consider the environment of academic science and 
the pressure placed on PIs when they are faced with making decisions that 
could be influenced by the private sector.  Importantly, the master policy 
would be the same for all PIs, but the roadmap to bringing all PIs into com-
pliance with the policy may need to be different for faculty with varying 
needs.  For example, different education or training programs may be 
needed for junior faculty than senior faculty.  While all would be held to the 
same standard under the policy, different approaches may be needed to ush-
er everyone under the umbrella of the policy. 
 
161. See generally Michael D. Mumford et al., A Sensemaking Approach to Ethics 
Training for Scientists: Preliminary Evidence of Training Effectiveness, 18 ETHICS 
BEHAVIOR 315 (2008) (discussing the effectiveness of ethics training). 
162. Sax & Doran, supra note 108, at 6-7. 
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A. Use of Default Rules 
Perhaps the best way to contain the amount of influence that the private 
sector may exert over any academic research is for universities to collec-
tively agree to a set of default rules for any contracts with the private sec-
tor.163  The combination of default rules and the use of incentives can chan-
nel PIs into making decisions that minimize conflict of interests.164 
For example, a default rule could be that the private sector cannot con-
tract for a delay of publication with any PI.  That is, a blanket prohibition 
against delay of the reporting of results.  Another possible default rule could 
be that a PI must design and approve the experimental design of the 
study.165  A series of default rules can be drafted that directly address 
known problems associated with the public-private interaction.  These rules 
can be amended to respond to changes in the marketplace or to address as of 
yet unknown situations in which a conflict of interest may arise. 
Default rules also have the advantage of taking the pressure off the PIs 
to negotiate with sophisticated private entities.  PIs are scientifically trained 
and not necessarily business-savvy.  For this reason, PIs should not be 
placed in positions in which they must negotiate with high-powered and 
self-interested private companies. 
The only way that default rules can work, however, is if all medical 
schools agree to a set of rules.  This is important because if Harvard applies 
a set of default rules, but Johns Hopkins does not, then industry will favor 
collaborations with PIs at Johns Hopkins.  Conflicts of interest will contin-
ue to plague scientific integrity at those schools that do not adopt the default 
rules.166 
B. Use of Technology Transfer Office 
The technology transfer (“tech transfer”) offices at universities may be 
the appropriate group to implement the default rules.  Tech transfer offices 
are responsible for facilitating the patenting and licensing of patented dis-
coveries developed at the university.167  Universities introduce “technology-
 
163. Cf. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 88, at 65. 
164. See id. (comparing disclosures and default rules). 
165. See, e.g., Sponsored Research Agreement, University of Pennsylvania (May 1, 
2004), http://www.upenn.edu/researchservices/pdfs/sponsres.pdf (this document does not 
address control of study design). 
166. For additional ideas on default rules, see Joanna K. Sax, Application of Default 
Rules to Address Financial Conflicts of Interest in Academic Medical Centers, IND. L.J. 
SUPP. (forthcoming). 
167. See Glossary & Acronym List, Technology Transfer, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, 
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/ 
glossary.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2011) (“Sharing of knowledge and facilities among Feder-
al laboratories, industry, universities, Government, and others to make federally generated 
scientific and technological advances accessible to private industry and State and local Gov-
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transfer offices to monitor, patent, and license potentially profitable disco-
veries of faculty.”168  However, no tech transfer office appears to be alike.  
That is, each university’s tech transfer office has its own policies and pro-
cedures.169  The problem is that there is no consistency as to how to address 
the public-private interaction.  The good news is that each tech transfer of-
fice provides a laboratory to analyze and determine which policies work 
and which policies do not. 
The general functions of a tech transfer office are as follows.170  First, a 
PI discloses an invention to the tech transfer office.171  The tech transfer of-
fice then evaluates whether the invention has a commercial use and whether 
to patent the technology.172  If the tech-transfer office decides to apply for a 
patent and a patent is awarded, then the tech transfer office will market the 
invention to potential licensees.173  Often, the PI will be involved in the 
marketing because they have the technical expertise to evaluate who will be 
a good licensee.174  Once a potential licensee is found, the tech transfer of-
fice will negotiate a license agreement.175  Following an initial licensing 
agreement, the tech transfer office will devote substantial resources to 
maintain and re-negotiate licensing agreements.176  Start-up companies for 
PIs and sponsored research agreements often result directly from the licens-
ing agreement.177  This is a general overview and as is often the case, the 
details will be different across tech transfer offices.  While the tech transfer 
office is in charge of licensing, it is unclear whether this department nego-
tiates contracts between PIs and the private sector for other types of fund-
ing, such as follow-up research on a particular project.  The PIs may be re-
ceiving private funding to continue research on a particular drug and this 
funding may be conditioned on certain provisions that contradict academic 
integrity, such as delay of publication. 
 
ernments.”). 
168. KRIMSKY, supra note 8, at 81. 
169. See Tyler III, supra note 26, at 167 (“[M]any of the technology transfer offices that 
began to proliferate after Bayh-Dole seem to have emerged without adequate consideration 
about how the offices fit within and in service to the academic mission, the numerous intel-
lectual property strategies available in addition to patenting and licensing, the financial and 
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170. Siegel et al., supra note 71, at 29. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 29. 
176. Id. at 30. 
177. Id. at 33; see also Kassirer, supra note 6, at 151 (“ . . . [B]usinesses were ‘spun off’ 
by faculty at an increasing rate.”); Of note, most schools do not make much money from the 
tech-transfer office. Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress: Are Universities Add-
ing to the Cost?, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1373, 1385 (2006-07). 
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The New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) published a study that 
analyzed the research institutions’ in-house conflict of interest policies.178  
Just a sampling of the different university policies illuminates the variation 
among institutions.  For example, some institutions require that PIs disclose 
financial relationships below that of the federal guidelines; others did not.179  
Some institutions require disclosure if the investigator believes that a possi-
bility of a conflict may arise in the future; others did not.180  Most institu-
tions analyzed did not have an explicit or mandatory strategy to manage the 
initial disclosure.181 
A different study of medical center conflict of interest policies was re-
ported in JAMA.182  Similar to the NEJM study, the authors found that each 
institution had varying policies.  For example, nineteen percent of the poli-
cies examined by the authors of this study contained prohibitions or limits 
on activities related to research and teaching.183  Of these, the activity that 
was most regulated was a faculty member having an equity interest in a 
company that sponsored their research.184  This means that the majority of 
the medical center’s policies failed to address potential conflicts of interest.  
Further, the study found that only twelve percent of policies limited the 
time that a PI could delay publication of results to allow review by a corpo-
rate sponsor or for the filing of a patent.185  A delay of publication or pres-
entation means that the data is not reaching the scientific community or the 
public.  Depending on the circumstances, this may be harmful.  For exam-
ple, imagine if research regarding the H1N1 vaccine was not released due to 
a delay of publication or presentation related to a corporate sponsor.186  This 
could have a devastating impact on the public. 
The advantage of the tech transfer offices is that private companies will li-
cense the right to develop university-owned technology.187  Prior to the 
Bayh-Dole Act, the Federal government owned the technologies derived 
from academic institutions and the private sector was relatively unwilling to 
 
178. Van McCrary et al., supra note 26, at 1622. Noteworthy is that this study analyzed 
medical schools and other research institutions. This study found differences in conflicts of 
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185. Id. 
186. The H1N1 pandemic hit the world in 2009. 2009 H1N1 Flu (“Swine Flu”) and 
You, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/ 
/h1n1flu/qa.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2011). 
187. Michael M.E. Johns et al., Restoring Balance to Industry-Academia Relationships 
in an Era of Institutional Financial Conflicts of Interest, 289 JAMA 741, 744 (2003). 
2012] Financial Conflicts of Interest in Science  321 
license government-held patents.188  The Bayh-Dole Act and the subsequent 
creation of tech transfer offices dramatically increased the abilities for pri-
vate companies to obtain and develop new technologies.189  Thus, the tech 
transfer office could be the central clearinghouse for all public-private inte-
ractions.  This office can work closely with other university offices to im-
plement effective conflict of interest policies. 
C. Education 
To many PIs, it may seem that the public-private interaction is at once 
both encouraged and discouraged.  The problem lies in achieving a balance 
between incentivizing a productive public-private relationship and discou-
raging a harmful public-private result.  One way to approach this difficulty 
is with education. 
In a similar vein, one tactic used to reduce workplace stress is second-
ary-level preventative interventions that teach employees to recognize stres-
sors in the workplace.190  Under this approach, employees are trained to 
identify and cope with workplace stressors.191  Studies have shown that 
cognitive-behavioral approaches to work-related stress may be effective.192  
This type of approach could be modified to address the chronic stress envi-
ronment of the academic medical world. 
In addition to the default rules, training or education programs may be 
employed to inform PIs about the academic-industry relationship and how 
to utilize this interaction in a way that promotes academic goals of objective 
and strong science.193  Many PIs may be unfamiliar with strategies em-
ployed by industry that creates conflicts of interest.  The results of our em-
pirical study, for example, demonstrate that junior faculty responded less 
appropriately to situations in which a conflict of interest may arise when 
compared with senior faculty.194  This is not surprising considering that ju-
nior faculty have less experience and may be under greater pressure to ob-
tain funding.  Thus, education programs aimed at graduate students, post-
docs, and junior faculty that educates these groups about conflicts of inter-
 
188. Id. at 744. 
189. Id. 
190. HEPBURN ET AL, supra note 142, at 359. 
191. Id. at 360. 
192. See Jac J. L. van der Klink et al., The Benefits of Interventions for Work-Related 
Stress, 91 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 270, 270, 274 (2001) (analyzing multiple studies). 
193. Education is important in addition to default rules because the default rules may not 
address or eliminate all areas in which a conflict of interest may arise. 
194. Sax & Doran, supra note 108, at 6; see also see also Pauker & Wong, supra note 
21, at 1233-4 (describing how medical students cannot process information as effectively as 
experienced clinicians). 
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est may be helpful.  In this way, junior faculty may be less likely to make a 
decision to enter into a relationship where a conflict of interest may arise.195 
Senior faculty may also benefit from education.  For example, senior 
faculty may be in a better position to be founders of start-up companies 
based on their academic research and may be more likely to serve as con-
sultants or advisors to industry.  Indeed, faculty is encouraged by the uni-
versity to form start-up companies and enter into advisory or consulting 
roles.196  But, PIs are scientists, not necessarily savvy business people, and 
additional education may be beneficial to inform senior faculty about situa-
tions in which a conflict of interest may arise.  If PIs are educated as to 
when a conflict of interest may arise, they may be more likely to insist on 
limitations as to their involvement so as to minimize the risk of a conflict of 
interest.197 
The need for education is also supported by evidence that faculty may 
not fully understand their institution’s conflict of interest policies.198  For 
example, many current conflict of interest policies require disclosure and 
then some sort of decision is made as to how to manage the conflict of in-
terest.199  Some faculty, however, may think that no research can be con-
ducted if a conflict of interest exists.200  This, however, is not a correct un-
derstanding, as universities may form committees to oversee studies in 
which a conflict of interest may exist.  Some faculty view their institution’s 
conflict of interest policy as an inhibitor to a PI’s ability to collaborate with 
industry.201  Other faculty view their institution’s conflict of interest policy 
as a welcome effort towards creating a productive environment.202 
In sum, there appears to be a disconnect between how PIs view conflicts of 
interest in general and how PIs view their institution’s approach to manag-
ing conflicts of interest once they arise.  An education program specifically 
designed to meet the needs of PIs may assist in lowering the number of sit-
uations in which a conflict of interest exists, which, in turn, may help to 
simplify the application of conflict of interest policies. 
 
195. Cf., Laura M. Brockway & Leo T. Furcht, Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Re-
search – the FASEB Guidelines, 20 FASEB J. 2435, 2436 (2006) (proposing guidelines for 
mentor-trainee relationships in academia-industry biomedical research); Mumford et al., su-
pra note 139, at 340 (noting the effect of day-to-day work experiences on doctoral students’ 
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196. See, e.g., Upstart, supra note 18. 
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PIs); Mumford et al., supra note 139, at 339-40 (noting that training senior investigators on 
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198. See Lipton et al., supra note 1, at 89-90. 
199. See id. at 86-87. 
200. See id. at 89-90. 
201. Id. at 90-91. 
202. Id. at 92. 
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D. Academic Requirements 
Another way to avoid or manage conflicts of interest is to reduce or 
eliminate the work stressors.203  For example, institutional changes in the 
requirements for review and promotion may alleviate some of the 
workplace stressors experienced by PIs.204  Changing the institutional re-
quirements, otherwise known as primary preventions, have shown to be ef-
fective in other circumstances.205 
Changing academic requirements for review and promotion is not an 
easy task and it is likely that the universities would prefer that the PIs figure 
out how to handle chronic stress on their own.206  However, studies show 
that changes in job design have beneficial effects on the employees.207 
In general, scientific publications publish positive results.  There may 
also be psychological reasons for the publication of positive results over 
negative results.  For example, if a new drug is a better treatment than the 
standard treatment, then this suggests that the new drug is a departure from 
standard treatment.208  That is a positive result that may help researchers, 
clinicians, and the public.  Negative results, although not as “sexy” and 
maybe psychologically unattractive, also have the ability to teach research-
ers, clinicians and the public. 
One change that could be considered is to allow unpublished negative 
results, if written-up, to be incorporated in reviews and promotions.  When 
an experiment or a series of experiments fails, the scientific community and 
the public at large may never learn of these experiments.  For example, a 
graduate student may spend years creating a transgenic mouse, but if the 
mouse has no phenotype, the result may never be published.  One reason for 
this is because sometimes it is difficult to interpret and learn from negative 
results.  A genetically modified mouse that does not show any developmen-
tal or health changes may or may not mean that the particular gene of inter-
est is important.  The peer-review of the negative results would occur with-
in the department to determine the significance of the negative results.  In 
many ways, it is the limitations on scientific experiments and discovery that 
may be the problem because we cannot yet test for certain characteristics. 
 
203. Cf., HEPBURN ET AL., supra note 142, at 344, 360 (describing the effect on em-
ployees of reducing workplace stressors). 
204. Cf., id. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. (“Unfortunately, the popularity of stress management programs suggests that 
organizations are more inclined to teach employees to cope with stress than to remove the 
sources of employee stress.”). 
207. Id. 
208. See Tyler III, supra note 26, at 203-04 (“To some degree, game theorists and econ-
omists alike might persuasively contend that motivating disclosure is a matter of demonstrat-
ing that it is worthwhile and better than the next, best alternative, which might be non-
disclosure, circumvention, or even departure.”). 
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The consideration of solid science that yields negative results may 
soothe some of the stress associated with review and promotion.  In this 
way, PIs may not feel the same level of chronic stress and they may, there-
fore, make different decisions. 
E. Incentivizing Medical Centers to Implement Conflict of Interest Policies 
To test and implement new ideas based on behavioral analysis, addi-
tional changes may be needed at the institutional level.  The structural 
changes discussed above, including education, default rules, and academic 
requirements, can be encouraged through an incentive system.  For exam-
ple, medical centers that create innovative and effective ways to address fi-
nancial conflicts of interest may be eligible for special funding opportuni-
ties through the NIH or NSF.209  An external review committee can be 
utilized to evaluate and provide feedback.210  Medical centers may also be 
eligible for special recognition or awards based on their programs.  Through 
both financial and reputational incentives, the institutions stand to gain from 
effectively addressing financial conflicts of interest.  This has the added 
benefit of allowing different medical centers to take different approaches to 
education, for example, and then study the effects of education over a five-
year period.  Effective programs can then serve as a model for other univer-
sities to adopt. 
On the other end, sanctions can be used as a disincentive to certain be-
haviors.  For example, if the NIH establishes an external review committee 
and this committee determines that a medical center is failing to implement 
policies to combat financial conflicts of interest, the medical center can first 
receive a written sanction.  If the medical center fails to respond and im-
prove its program, then the NIH can consider suspending research privileg-
es or funding.211  One problem with this approach, however, is that it may 
have the unwanted effect of punishing innocent PIs because they would ex-
perience collateral damage and be affected by a suspension of privileges or 
funding.  Another possibility is for the university, itself, to utilize internal 
sanctions as a mechanism to deter PIs from entering into situations that 
create a conflict of interest.212 
F. Changes to Intellectual Property Law 
Another way to change the academic environment is to address whether 
current IP law is properly suited to advance science in academic settings.  
 
209. Cf., Sandra Titus & Xavier Bosch, Tie Funding to Research Integrity, 466 NATURE 
436, 437 (July 22, 2010) (promoting good research practices through an incentive system). 
210. Id. 
211. Id. 
212. See Tom R. Tyler, Managing Conflicts of Interest with Organizations, CONFLICTS 
OF INTEREST 13, 17 (Moore, Cain, Lowenstein & Bazerman eds., 2005). 
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IP law is an external pressure that impacts how the private sector interacts 
with academia.  Universities and the private sector may be encouraged to 
patent discoveries for economic motives.  These economic motives may 
conflict with non-financial responsibilities of PIs who conduct research 
with public money.  A reflection upon the past thirty years of the public-
private interaction may provide valuable insight into the adjustment of IP 
law to balance ways to incentivize innovation without causing harm to the 
public. 
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, et al. v. USPTO, et al., known as the 
Myriad case, is illustrative of the problem created when economic motives 
may conflict with the public’s access to medical treatment.  This case in-
volved technology that was created through a private-academic relationship.  
In brief, in the Myriad case, Plaintiffs complained that Myriad’s patents on 
the breast cancer genes, isolated BRCA1/2, created a problem whereby re-
searchers could not conduct clinical research on these genes and patients 
did not have access to genetic screening.213  One reason, for example, that 
patients did not have access to genetic screening was that Myriad might not 
have accepted their insurance.214  The University of Utah Research Founda-
tion was named as a defendant because it had ownership interest in each of 
the patents at issue in the case.215  The history of the discoveries that led to 
the patent applications for BRCA1/2 straddled several years.  Suffice it to 
say, both public and private money was used and several collaborations be-
tween the private sector and universities were involved in the discoveries 
that led to the patents at issue.216  Since being granted the patents, Myriad 
vigorously defended its patent rights by sending cease and desist letters to 
multiple academic medical institutions who were testing its patients for mu-
tations in the BRACA1/2 genes.217 Plaintiffs argued that Myriad’s patents 
hindered patient access to tests, interfered with research in this area and im-
pacted patient care.218  Myriad disagreed.219  The trial court did not resolve 
the questions of fact argued by each side; instead, the court held the patents 
invalid because isolated genes are not patentable as a matter of law.  That is, 
the BRCA1/2 genes are a product of nature and therefore not patentable.220  
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit overturned the trial 
court’s decision, 2-1.221 
 
213. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, et al. v. USPTO, et al., 669 F. Supp. 2d 365 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
214. Id. at 375. 
215. Id. at 376-77. 
216. Id. at 378. 
217. Id. at 379. 
218. Id. at 380-81. 
219. Id. at 381. 
220. Id. at 381. 
221. Andrew Pollack, Ruling Upholds Gene Patent in Cancer Test, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 
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The BRCA1/2 gene patents arose from the public-private interaction; 
however, once the patents were granted, it appears that the exclusivity argu-
ably caused harm to the public, which is a separate policy issue from 
whether or not the court correctly applied the facts to the Patent Act.  While 
it is understandable that some sort of exclusive period or reward is needed 
to incentivize the research and development of new medical technologies; 
any policy must balance this with the needs of the public to receive access 
to medical therapy as well as allow for the academic community to continue 
research.  Others have proposed exemptions from infringement or other so-
lutions.222 
The ability to patent genes may also impact innovation.223  For exam-
ple, it may be difficult to create diagnostic tests for particular diseases due 
to fear of infringement.224  In many ways the greatest impact is felt in the 
private sector because it is the biotechnology industry that is the market for 
diagnostic tests.  But, the weight of the patent world will also be felt in aca-
demics, particularly in the clinic.  For example, clinicians at major medical 
centers experienced difficulty in testing new diagnostic methods for breast 
cancer because they received cease and desist letters from Myriad.225 
It is unclear how to resolve the issues raised by IP law.  On the one 
hand, universities and the private sector want the exclusivity period on dis-
coveries.  On the other hand, it may be difficult to arrange licensing agree-
ments on many types of patents, such as gene patents, for a small company 
to profitably design and market a new type of test.226  This has the effect of 
deterring innovation.  That is, if it seems too difficult to obtain licenses, a 
new company may decide not to invent a new test.  Or, if a new company 
thinks that it may face intense litigation, even if no patent is infringed, that 
can deter the formation or funding of a new company.  One way to resolve 
some of the issues raised, for example by gene patents, is to say that DNA 
(including human engineered DNA or cDNA) cannot be patented.227 
It is unclear whether the incentives created by IP law are really neces-
sary in the academic world.  PIs are motivated by concerns such as ad-
vancement in understanding, treating disease, and improve reputations.228  
That is, PIs will pursue scientific advancement even in the absence of IP 
 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/30/business/gene-patent-in-cancer-test-upheld-by-
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225. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, et al. v. USPTO, et al., 669 F. Supp. 2d 365, 378-
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protection.229  It may be however, that patent protection contributes to pri-
vate sector investment.230 
In sum, intellectual property laws have cascading effects on academics 
and biotechnology.  It may be that the current intellectual property laws are 
not well-suited for biomedical discovery and innovation.  Changes in IP law 
may have the added benefit of changing the environment of academic scien-
tists. 
G. Industry 
Industry has an interest in maintaining the integrity of academic scien-
tists.231  Industry seeks academics to conduct science and publish articles 
for a number of reasons including: (1) academics are often the best and 
brightest, (2) academics have the highest reputation for objectivity, and (3) 
public trust in academics is generally high.  If the reputation and credibility 
of academic institutions and PIs are harmed, collaborations between the 
private sector and academic centers are tarnished.  For this reason, industry 
should be receptive to institutional and legal changes that effectively curb 
financial conflicts of interest by properly managing the public-private inte-
raction. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A new model is needed to address financial conflicts of interest.  The use of 
disclosure as the cornerstone to manage conflicts of interest is only a band-
aid on a much larger problem.  In- depth analysis, empirical data, and appli-
cation of social science and psychology are needed to effectively create a 
policy to manage conflicts of interest created by the public-private interac-
tion.  In this way, the benefits of the public-private interaction can thrive, 
while the negative consequences can be avoided. 
This Article proposes that changes to the internal and external environments 
of PIs can change how PIs make decisions in situations in which conflicts 
of interest may arise.  While structural changes are much more difficult to 
accomplish than implementing a policy of disclosure, time has shown that 
disclosure is an ineffective way to address conflicts of interest.  For this 
reason, new approaches that alter the environment will prove useful in ad-
dressing this important area of concern. 
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